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Abstract 
Most analyses of the African Union (AU) focus on the politics of the state and presidents. 
There are very few analyses that focus on aspects such as youth development. This article 
departs from that tradition. It argues that although the youth were always part of important 
historical developments in Africa, they have remained on the periphery. In recent times, 
particularly since the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the AU in 
the 2000s, the youth development agenda has begun to receive attention at the policy level. 
In 2015, the AU through Agenda 2063 went a step further by elevating youth matters to 
the mainstream continental policy framework. While these developments are all welcome, 
it emerges clear that in the arena of youth political participation, the continent remains 
hesitant. Where the AU and its member states adopt the language and grammar of youth 
inclusion, of which youth political participation is often limited, such is not met with fitting 
institutional and practical policy arrangements. This article finds that the African elite is in 
for a rude awakening, as we have witnessed since 2011, given the discovery by the African 
youth of new methods of political participation in post-colonial Africa. It advocates for the 
adoption of the African community outlook to a youth state policy, argues for linking youth 
to the project of economic freedom, and implores the African elite to embark upon the 
decolonial project to resolve the bearings of coloniality of being, power and knowledge. 
 
Introduction  
 Although the youth played an important role in the fight against colonialism in Africa, the 
liberating generation upon taking office did not see the need of placing youth development at the 
center of state policy in the liberated zones. The youth were to regard themselves as beneficiaries 
of an independent Africa which must be grateful to the fearless freedom fighters who freed the 
continent from colonial rule. 24 years after Namibia attained independence, former President of 
Namibia Hifikepunye Pohamba gave this warning to the youth of Namibia on 26 August 2014: 
“this [liberation struggle] was not easy as some of you want to believe. It was hard, long and bitter 
and we, the old freedom fighters, fought to the end and liberated the country and the people. Some 
of us lost our lives because of this right cause (Shivute, 2014).      
 In some extreme cases, the expectations of the youth to sing praises to liberating heroes led 
to dictatorships. In Malawi, President Kamuzu Banda ensured that everything in Malawi had been 
revolved around him. As Malawian academic Professor Wiseman Chijere Chirwa explains 
“throughout the 1960s, political songs reflected Banda's consolidation of power and his emerging 
dictatorship. Because of his heroic triumph, everything in the country belonged to him” (Chirwa 
2001, p. 8). African liberation leaders even created concepts and philosophies that were forced 
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down the throats of the citizens as national philosophies and concepts. South African political 
scientist Prince Mashele explains such an occurrence in Kenya:  
 
In Kenya, during the reign of Daniel Arap Moi… citizens were obliged to follow in the 
footsteps of Moi. To entrench his despotism, Moi introduced a philosophy called Nyayo 
(footstep) projecting himself as a pathfinder and the rest of society as followers. Political 
commentators who dared not to follow in Moi’s footsteps faced one of two hard realities: 
you disappear or flee to exile. So serious was Moi about his Nyayo philosophy that he 
could replace a vice-chancellor of any university with someone prepared to follow in the 
correct political footsteps.   (Mashele, 2011) 
 
The continent is, therefore, nourished with many examples illustrating how African 
liberation leaders perceived post-independent Africa as a personal trophy they obtained for 
liberating the continent through their heroic deeds. The citizens, particularly the youth, must at all 
time - it was made clear - be grateful and celebrate the freedom fighters and allow them to rule 
undisturbed. Fast forward to 2017, Africa still has the world’s oldest leaders. Below is an 
illustration of Africa’s top 20 oldest presidents for illustrative purposes;  
 
Table 1 
Rulers by country and age 
Name Country Age 
1. Robert Mugabe Zimbabwe 93 
2. Beji Caid Essebsi Tunisia 91 
3. Paul Biya Cameroon 84 
4. Abselaziz Bouteflika Algeria 80 
5. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf Liberia 79 
6. Alpha Conde Guinea 79 
7. Peter Mutharika Malawi 77 
8. Hage Geingob Namibia 76 
9. Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo Equatorial Guinea 75 
10. Jose Eduardo dos Santos Angola 75 
11. Alassane Ouattara Cote d’ivore 75 
12. Jacob Zuma South Africa 75 
13. Mohammadu Buhari Nigeria 74 
14. Denis Ngueso Congo 74 
15. Akufo Addo Ghana 73 
16. Yoweri Museveni Uganda 73 
17. Pakalitha Mosilili Lesotho 73 
18. Omar al-Bashir Sudan 73 
19. Ibrahim Boubacar Keita Mali 72 
20. Ismail Omar Guelleh Djibouti 71 
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To put Table 1 in fitting context and to understand how liberating leaders in Africa saw 
themselves as the only ones to govern Africa, it is necessary to juxtapose the above table to Table 
2 of Africa’s longest serving leaders. The table below shows that most of Africa’s oldest leaders 
are also the longest serving leaders. Although it may appear obvious that the oldest would be 
longest serving, it must be clarified, for example, that while Ghana’s Akufo Addo may be Africa’s 
15th oldest leader, he only has been in office a few months, having assumed office only in January 
2017. Namibia’s Hage Geingob is Africa’s 8th oldest leader but has only spent two years in office 
since his inauguration in March 2015.  
 
Table 2 
Leaders by country and years in office 
Name Country Years in office 
1. Paul Biya Cameroon 42 years 
2. Teodoro Obiang Mbasogo Equatoria Guinea 38 years 
3. Jose Eduardo dos Santos Angola 38 years 
4. Robert Mugabe Zimbabwe 37 years 
5. Yoweri Museveni Uganda 31 years 
6. Omar al-Bashir Sudan 28 years 
7. Idris Deby Chad 27 years 
8. Isaias Afwerki Eritrea 26 years 
9. Paul Kagame Rwanda 23 years 
10. Denis Sassou Nguesso Congo 20 years 
 
This state of African leadership has not only generated an interest by foreign scholars, such 
as Aguilar (1998), but from countries led by relatively younger leaders. African scholars and 
researchers have also taken keen interest in this debate. This debate is captured around the concept 
of gerontocracy. Nigerian academic, Omotade Adegbindin, explains that a gerontocracy “is a 
political system, a form of oligarchical rule, whereby a small group of elderly individuals are in 
control of power. Unpopular due to its peculiar nature, it is in short, a rule by old men” 
(Adegbindin, 2011, p. 454). Drawing from other scholars to locate this concept in Africa, 
Adegbindin (2011) captures Dei (1994) explaining that in African tradition a gerontocracy is seen 
as occurring where “respect for the authority of elderly persons for their wisdom, knowledge of 
community affairs, and ‘closeness’ to the ancestors… there is in Africa a general belief that ‘old 
age comes with wisdom and an understanding of the world’” (Adegbindin, 2011, p. 13). Kenyan 
academic Peter Onyango Onyoyo provides clarity in detail:  
 
Gerontocracy is the rule by elders or a type of government that associates leadership with 
elders. … Ipso facto in several African traditional societies in which customary law ruled 
the lives of people, the role of elders was substantial and critical for order and harmony. 
The elders are construed to be the custodians of customary law, its promulgators and 
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enforcers… In the post-independent Africa, gerontocracy in the political sense has become 
notorious as some elders cling on power to dominate and favour their next of kin. 
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe is an example in which the leader sees his status as 
elder to be the reason to cling on power. The late Muammar Ghedafi did the same in Libya, 
President Paul Biye of Cameroon, and the late President Eyadema of Togo did the same. 
Elders in political leadership in Africa have been associated with hunger for power other 
than wisdom.   (Onyoyo 2017, pp. 2-3) 
  
It should, therefore, be no surprise that the entire structure of the OAU did not have a clear 
and specialized function dedicated to a continental youth development agenda. The Pan African 
Youth Movement (PYM) which later became the Pan African Youth Union (PYU) established in 
1962 (a year before the founding of the OAU in 1963) was recognized by the OUA but never 
integrated into its activities. Historically, the PYM consisted of the youth of African ruling political 
parties in general and youth of former liberation movements in particular. After achieving 
independence, the PYM lost currency in the eyes of the liberating leaders subsequently losing 
momentum (Nueys, 2012).  The African Union (AU), the successor of the OAU, established in 
1999, only became concerned with youth development seven years after its formation. This is 
confirmed by the AU 2011 State of the African Youth Report 2011 in no uncertain terms.   
 
Africa’s commitment to youth development and welfare was amply manifested in 2006 
with the adoption by African Heads of State and Government of the African Youth Charter. 
The charter provides a framework for developing and implementing more tangible youth 
policies and programmes. (AUC, 2012, p. VII)  
 
In a foreword to the same report, Professor Jean-Pierre Ezin, the then Commissioner for 
Human Resources, Science and Technology of the African Union Commission (AUC), 
summarized what to him was continental commitment to the continental youth development 
agenda.  
 
The African Union Commission has come a long way in its efforts to promote youth 
development and empowerment in Africa. It developed the African Youth Charter, which 
was approved by African Heads of State and Government in 2006 and which entered into 
force in a relatively short time. The Charter constitutes a continental legal framework that 
seeks to re-position the challenges, potential, contributions and rights of young people in 
the mainstream of Africa’s socio-economic growth and development. In 2009, the AU 
Executive Council declared the years 2009-2018 as the Decade for Youth Development 
and Empowerment in Africa. Subsequently, the AU Ministers in Charge of Youth Affairs 
approved the Decade Plan of Action (DPoA) – a roadmap for accelerating the 
implementation of the charter. By deciding to focus on the theme Accelerating Youth 
Empowerment for Sustainable Development for the 2011 Summit of African Union Heads 
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of State and Government, the AU demonstrates the importance it attaches to the role and 
contribution of the youth in the development process.  (AU 2012, p. VI)  
 
The mindset of the liberation leaders – of youth to be grateful to political freedom fighters 
– has extended to the technical staff of the AUC. How else does one explain AUC commissioner 
Ezin’s conclusion that something as flimsy as a theme can be regarded as demonstrating the 
importance that the AU attaches to the role and contribution of the youth in the development 
process? In 2011, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) released its 2011 
African Youth Report. Abdoulie Janneh, the then United Nations Under-Secretary-General and 
Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, did not conceal the reality of the 
exclusion and nonparticipation of African youth in decision making.  
 
As argued in this report, young people need an enabling environment politically, 
economically and socially to thrive in our countries. They need to be empowered so that 
they can be represented and participate in decision-making processes that affect their lives. 
Though Africa has made progress in providing education and skills for more young people 
than ever before, youth unemployment and underemployment remain a major challenge. 
Innovative approaches and in-depth analysis of youth issues at both the design and 
implementation phases of policies and programmes are needed to ensure effective delivery 
and better outcomes towards a great future for the young women and men of Africa. 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2011, p. VIII)  
 
To its credit, the AU distinguished itself from the OAU by creating a youth division within 
the structures of the AUC. According to the AU, the “youth division under the Department of 
Human Resources, Science & Technology (HRST) is the division responsible for Africa’s Youth 
Agenda in the African Union Commission (AUC)” (African Union Commission, 2017). Most 
importantly, the AU’s language and articulation of the importance of the youth division is the most 
telling in the subsequent sentences, “It [Youth Division] promotes youth participation such as 
organizing youth forums and celebrating Africa Youth Day. By harmonizing and coordinating 
member states as well as bringing together all relevant stakeholders, the youth division is mandated 
to, among other functions, use the outcomes and recommendations from all sectors through 
appropriate training frameworks to strengthen the African Youth” (African Union Commission, 
2017).  
What the above states is simply that the AU sees youth participation as represented by 
flimsy things such as celebrating Youth Day. This mindset is similar to that of Kamuzu Banda of 
Malawi, as discussed earlier, who saw the role of the youth and women as that of singing, clapping 
hands and celebrating him. The AU makes it clear that the mandate of the division is not to ensure 
that youth have input into decisions but merely to receive and accept outcomes and 
recommendations. From the 21st-25th of May 2016, the AU held what was called the Banjul+10 
Summit on the 10-year implementation of the African Youth Charter in The Gambia to review the 
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progress made in regard to the African Youth Charter since its adoption in 2006. It was found that 
most African states still did not ratify the Charter. In the outcome document, the AU set a target 
of ensuring that there would be a “hundred percent ratification by the end of 2016” (African Union, 
2016). Speaking on the future prospects for African youth, in Germany on 6 April 2017 at the 
Potsdam Dialogues, the AUC Commissioner for Human Resources, Science and Technology, 
Martial De-Paul Ikounga, disclosed that the wishful target of 100 percent ratification of the charter 
that was previously set in Banjul was not achieved (Ikounga, 2017).  
What emerges clearly from the above is that to both the OAU and its successor the AU, the 
youth and the youth agenda are either a non-issue or peripheral issue. In response, the youth did 
not sit idle. There have been a number of responses from the African youth. Although the PYU 
enjoyed cordial relations with both the OUA and AU, it faced several challenges, particularly 
financial challenges, given the somewhat ‘arm-chair’ approach of leadership of the continental 
body. The continental youth body was forced to change its headquarters three times: from 
Conakry, Guinea, to Algiers, Algeria in 1967; then from Algiers to Khartoum, Sudan, in 2008 
(NUEYS, 2012). Speaking at the African Youth Day on 1 November 2012, the former chairperson 
of the African Union Commission Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma admitted the serious challenges faced 
by the PYU thus promising the AUC’s commitment to embark upon the revitalization of the Pan 
African Youth Union (The Point, 2012). It does not require sophistication to note that revitalization 
can only take place when faced with decline and weakening.   
From the 1st to 4th of November 2013 in Tunisia, the AUC in collaboration with the New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) coordinating Agency, the African Development 
Bank and the ECA organized a youth consultative meeting on the envisaged Agenda 2063. This 
meeting culminated in the establishment of the AU Youth Working Group (AUYWG). The 
AUYWG later transformed itself into the African Youth Commission (AYC) that held its first 
General Assembly and elected the founding leadership in January 2017 on the sidelines of the AU 
Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The AYC, seeing itself as the youth version of the AUC, set its 
objective as an organization where “all inspiring and capable young African leaders and African 
Diaspora can organize themselves, take up their responsibilities, strengthen cooperation among the 
youth and youth structures as a platform, speak up and promote youth voices in the context of 
Africa’s development” (African Youth Commission, 2017). It further outlined its objectives as:  
 
to organize all young people in Africa and Diaspora for the promotion of African unity and 
development through linkage of youth and youth structures and mobilization of resources 
(human, technical, technology and finance) to support the work of African youth, youth 
structures, Pan African Youth Union and Youth Division of the African Union Commission 
in their quest to effective service delivery and advocacy activities on the African Youth 
Charter, other AU legal instruments and youth projects at national, regional and continental 
levels for the advancement of Africa (African Youth Commission, 2017, p. 4).  
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As it did with the PYU, the AU took an “arm-chair” approach to the AYC although it 
played an indirect role in its creation. Towards the AYC General Assembly in January 2017, the 
African Union Youth Division released a statement that was regarded as an attempt to either 
sabotage or distance the continental body from the youth program. The statement, released on 13 
January 2017, merely a week before the youth General Assembly, read:  
 
With regards to the upcoming AYC Annual General Assembly on the 22-25 January 2017 
in Addis Ababa, we wish to categorically state that we have not been involved in the 
coordination of this event as has been erroneously reported across various 
media.  Unfortunately, this avoidable situation is a misrepresentation that has caused 
confusion, particularly among prospective participants, and simultaneously hampered the 
event’s credibility.  (African Union Youth Division, 2017) 
  
While making such damaging remarks, the division still went on to state that it would 
encourage “pro-active initiatives of African youth in forming organizations, networks or think 
tanks as a response to the prevailing challenges that affect them; whether it is at the national, 
regional or continental levels” (African Union Youth Division, 2017). Be that as it may, the AYC 
General Assembly went ahead and elected its leadership. This then meant that there were now two 
continental youth organizations: the PYU and the AYC. One of the arguments used by those at the 
forefront of AYC is that unlike PYU that is host to the National Youth Councils, the AYC 
membership is open to individual youth and civil society organizations that would not get an 
opportunity to engage in the continental youth development agenda under the PYU framework. 
The other argument used against the PYU is that it appears to be too political and aligned to ruling 
parties in Africa of which some are responsible for the suppression of the youth and 
underdevelopment. In other words, the PYU, through its national youth councils, stands complicit.  
There have been responses from African youth, responses to gerontocracies, 
authoritarianism, corruption and underdevelopment, outside the PYU and AYC structures. One of 
the well-known initiatives taken by the youth of Africa to ensure political participation is what has 
come to be known as the Arab Springs - the popular grassroots protests that took place in North 
Africa and toppled several African dictators. Ruge (2012) explains what underpinned the Arab 
Spring.   
 
At the heart of the Arab Spring was a disgruntled youth class seeking democratic 
representation and economic participation. Remember Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian 
street vendor whose self-immolation launched the uprisings? He didn’t set himself ablaze 
because he had a smart phone. His self-immolation was his last desperate attempt to bring 
attention to his economic exclusion. His peers in the region sympathized and, almost 
overnight, Tunisia and the political landscape of most of Northern Africa changed. It was 
a signal that Africa’s ruling class was under siege. On one end, Mr. Bouazizi, aged 26, 
represented Africa’s emerging youth class, an impatient demographic eager to upend the 
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status quo (he was only five years younger than the median Tunisian). On the other, 
deposed dictator Ben Ali, age 76, stood as a breed of elder statesmen – disconnected from 
the needs of populations, and facing extinction. 
As dictators in North Africa were being toppled, their contemporaries in the rest of the 
continent worked hard to control the youth and avoid similar uprising. Ugandan President Yoweri 
Museveni is said to have deployed the military into the streets of Kampala to quell protests (Smith, 
2011). Despite these attempts, the youth in the zones with long serving and authoritarian leaders 
still managed to wage protests in one way or the other. Years later, in 2014, the long-serving despot 
Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso was forced to flee the country. Pictures of youth jubilantly 
jumping on top of seats in Burkina Faso Parliament went viral on social media (Berman, 2014). In 
stable democracies, where corruption and underdevelopment were rampant, particularly in 
Southern Africa, the youth formed radical social movements agitating for transformation, social 
justice and equality. Consider the case of Namibia as explained by Namibian academic Phanuel 
Kaapama (2016, p. 32):  
 
Namibia reached her Fanonian moment… a new generation has entered the country’s 
social and political scene and has forcefully asked penetrating new questions. So, 
Namibia’s ‘Fanonian moment’ has come in the form of the [Affirmative Repositioning] 
AR movement. Other issues that have come under the radar of AR’s fervent political eye 
include the perceived/allege widespread nepotism and corruption among the political and 
economic elite… The AR movement has ‘declared war’ on what it calls the “general 
zombie tendency” and its politics of hand-clapping and singing for the satisfaction of 
politicians, by working towards liberating the youth by converting them into active citizens 
and upright activists.  
 
In some parts of North Africa, the youth have taken serious risks such as attempting to 
cross rivers and oceans into Europe in search of economic opportunities and political stability. 
Consider the case that The Gambia reported, “for its size, Gambia is experiencing a 
disproportionate number of people leaving the country. Its population is just under 2 million, yet 
over the past two years, it has been ranked fourth and fifth in the International Organisation for 
Migration’s league of the six main nationalities identified attempting to cross the Mediterranean 
from Libya to Italy” (Hunt, 2015). In North, East and West Africa some youth resolved to join 
armed military groups such as Boko Haram and others (Onuoha, 2014). 
This account and survey of continental youth political participation and developmental 
agenda was necessary to buttress the point that the scope of analysis should not only concern itself 
with the center and the institutions within its reach but should also consider (a) the existence of a 
periphery, (b) an understanding of why the periphery exists, and (c) the interaction, if any, between 
the center and periphery. The fundamental question, therefore, remains - who is in? Who is 
included in the center-led conversation and who do they represent? Indeed, who is out and what 
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do they feel and what are they going to and willing to do about it? It is only when these questions 
are answered that it can be determine how youth political participation can be improved. 
 
Agenda 2063 - Who Is The “We”? 
 
The Essence of Agenda 2063  
 Agenda 2063 is a program of the AU adopted by African Heads of State and Government 
who assembled in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the 24th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the 
Union in January 2015. In that session outcome, the African Heads of State and Governments 
romanticized Agenda 2063 as  
“[an] endogenous plan for transformation. It harnesses the continent’s comparative advantages 
such as its people, history and cultures; its natural resources; its position and repositioning in the 
world to effect equitable and people-centered social, economic and technological transformation 
and the eradication of poverty. It seeks to fulfil our obligation to our children as an inter-
generational compact, to develop Africa’s human capital; build social assets, infrastructure and 
public goods; empower women and youth; promote lasting peace and security; build effective 
developmental states and participatory and accountable institutions of governance; [articulate] 
Africa’s vision and roadmap for sequencing our sectoral and normative, national, regional and 
continental plans into a coherent whole; plus, be a call to action to all Africans and people of 
African descent, to take personal responsibility for the destiny of the continent and as the primary 
agents of change and transformation, and a commitment from citizens, leadership, governments 
and institutions at national, regional and continental levels to act, coordinate, and cooperate for the 
realization of this vision”  (AU, 2015, p. 13).  
And, as a policy framework that aims to provide a collective developmental path for 
Africa’s development, Agenda 2063 is anchored on 7 pillars: (1) a prosperous Africa based on 
inclusive growth and sustainable development; (2) an integrated continent, politically united and 
based on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance; (3) an Africa of 
good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; (4) a peaceful 
and secure Africa;  (5) an Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, shared values 
and ethics; (6) an Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African 
people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children; and (7) an Africa as a strong, 
united and influential global player and partner (AU, 2015).  
 
Youth Content in Agenda 2063  
 While there might not be a specific aspiration that speaks to youth political participation, 
it is important to note that aspiration 6 speaks of an Africa whose development is people driven 
and relies on the potential of the African people, especially its youth. What Agenda 2063 does, 
despite tokenism analysis, is to depart from a longstanding tradition of the OAU and AU of 
peripherising youth development. In fact, the OAU Charter, in both Article II (purposes) and 
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Article III (principles), makes no mention or inference to youth (Elias, 1965). The Constitutive 
Act of the AU also does not change this state of affairs. Its Article 3 (on the Objectives of the AU) 
and Article 4 (on the Principles of the AU) both fail to make mention of the youth (AU, 2000). 
While some might argue that the youth do not necessarily warrant mentioning in these legislative 
instruments, it must be noted that the AU Constitutive Act mentions in Article 4 the promotion of 
gender equality (often a twin to youth empowerment/inclusion) as one of the principles of the AU. 
Agenda 2063, therefore, departs from the AU tradition of placing youth at the periphery. The 
policy framework admits that “no society can reach its full potential, unless it empowers … youth” 
and sets an objective of having an engaged and empowered youth (AU, 2015). Furthermore, it 
articulates and makes the following daring declarations on youth as part of Aspiration 6:  
 The youth of Africa shall be socially, economically and politically empowered through the 
full implementation of the African Youth Charter.  
 All forms of systemic inequalities, exploitation, marginalization and discrimination of 
young people will be eliminated, and youth issues mainstreamed in all development 
agendas.  
 Youth unemployment will be eliminated, and Africa’s youth guaranteed full access to 
education, training, skills and technology, health services, jobs and economic 
opportunities, and recreational and cultural activities as well as financial means and all 
necessary resources to allow them to realize their full potential.  
 Young African men and women will be the path breakers of the African knowledge society 
and will contribute significantly to innovation and entrepreneurship. The creativity, energy 
and innovation of Africa’s youth shall be the driving force behind the continent’s political, 
social, cultural and economic transformation.  
 It is evident that Agenda 2063 has some content on the youth. As stated before, the decision 
to place youth in a central/mainstream AU document is a serious departure from the policy 
positions and approach of both the OUA and AU. In 2013, the AU started consulting the youth 
regarding Agenda 2063. The consultations will later bear fruit if the content of Agenda 2063 is 
taken into consideration. In November 2013 in Hamamet, Tunisia, the AU held consultation with 
the youth on Agenda 2063. It was at this gathering that the youth immaculately presented to the 
AU their desire to actively participate in the politics and governance of the AU, and its member 
states. The youth went further to indicate that the Africa they want is one wherein they are involved 
in the drafting of policies and take an active part in the implementation and monitoring process. 
At that conference, youth political participation was invoked. Resultantly, a working group called 
the African Union Youth Working Group (AUYWG) was established to ensure that the resolution 
of the youth that gathered there was included in the African developmental way forward in general 
and in Agenda 2063 in particular. Four years later, in 2017, the AUYWG transformed itself into 
an independent continental youth organization, the AYC, whose primary purpose would be to 
monitor the AUC and the AU and ensure that youth concerns would not be placed at the periphery 
(Dhlamini, 2017). This development alone indicates not only the input youth made into Agenda 
2063 but their determination to create their own independent spaces and ensure political 
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participation. The other aspects of youth consultation and input into Agenda 2063 took place at 
the state level. The AU policy organ, at its July 2014 meeting in Equatorial Guinea, had tasked 
member states to embark upon domestic consultations with various stakeholders (youth, academia, 
women, civil society and women) and submit the outcomes to the AUC by 31 October 2014. South 
Africa, for example, held such consultation with the youth on 11 July 2014 (DIRCO, 2015). 
 
‘It Is In But Not In’ 
 In November 2015, the biggest daily newspaper in Namibia, The Namibian, ran a story that 
President Hage Geingob had temporarily moved out of the State House to his mansion on the 
outskirts of the capital city, Windhoek, to allow for expensive renovations that were in line with 
his taste. The Presidential Affairs Minister, Frans Kapofi, was at pains in explaining as to whether 
the President had moved out of the State House. In response to journalists, who were asking for 
confirmation as to whether the president has indeed moved out, Kapofi flip-flopped stating the 
following, “He [president] is here but he is not here” (Immanuel & Mongudhi, 2015).  Kapofi’s 
explanation is a fitting importation to explain youth political participation in Agenda 2063 or, 
though slightly amended, to ‘it is in, but not in’. While there is considerable content and mention 
in Agenda 2063 of youth, it is not clear as to whether this constitutes political participation. The 
language and grammar of Agenda 2063 speaks to what the AU will do for youth and not what it 
can do together with youth. It sees youth as mere subjects to benefit from the generosity of their 
elders who have now mentioned them in their documents. It makes use of terms such as “support 
young people” and many ‘othering’ terms when discussing the youth. The main version, called the 
popular version of Agenda 2063, states the following as the actionable programs that speak to 
youth (AU, 2015):  
… support young people as drivers of Africa’s renaissance, through investment in their 
health, education and access to technology, opportunities and capital, and concerted 
strategies to combat youth unemployment and underemployment. Ensure faster movement 
on the harmonization of continental admissions, curricula, standards, programmes and 
qualifications and raising the standards of higher education to enhance the mobility of 
African youth and talent across the continent.  
 
 It is evident that what is an envisaged and actionable program of the Agenda 2063 does not 
include political participation. The language and grammar of Agenda 2063 make itself available 
to the interpretation that reform and youth inclusion are limited to health, education, technology, 
economic opportunities and education. Youth political participation is not conspicuously part of 
Agenda 2063. They are thus perceived as readily available beneficiaries of the political generosity 
of their elders who have now included their issues in key policy documents such as Agenda 2030. 
The youth are, therefore ‘In but not in’ in Agenda 2063. Agenda 2063 is often paraded, and its 
content so read, around the phrase of ‘The Africa We Want.’ Although it appears that youth are 
indeed part of the we, or they might perceive themselves as part of the we, it appears, on closer 
inspection, that the we is an exclusive imagery of the African Heads of State and Government. As 
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will be further elaborated in the proceeding pages, youth political participation remains a 
peripheral concern despite making an appearance in key policy documents of the AU.  
 
African Political Elite Orientation towards Youth Political Participation 
As has been explored and displayed earlier, youth matters have always been peripheral in 
the imagination and discourse of African political leaders. If the youth matters are themselves 
peripheral, one can only imagine how distant youth political participation would be in the minds 
of African political leaders. To understand what and how African leaders perceive youth, one only 
needs to study how the African governments conceptualize ministries dealing with youth affairs. 
A short illustration is thus necessary. 
 
Table 3 
Country and youth participation 
Country Name Name of Ministry 
Angola Youth and Sport 
Burkina Faso Youth, Professional Education and Employment  
Cameroon Youth Affairs and Civic Education  
DRC Youth and Sports 
Ethiopia Youth and Sports  
Gabon Youth and Sports 
Kenya Public Service, Youth and Gender Affairs 
Lesotho Gender and Youth, Sports and Recreation 
Liberia Youth and Sports 
Mali Youth and Citizenship Building  
Namibia Youth, Sports and National Service 
Nigeria Youth Development 
Rwanda Youth and ICT 
Senegal Youth, Employment and Promotion of Civic Values 
Sudan Youth and Sports 
The Gambia Youth and Sports 
Togo Basic Development, Crafts, Youth and Youth Employment 
Tunisia Youth, Sports, Women and Families 
Uganda Youth and Children Affairs 
Zimbabwe Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment  
 
 Table 3 represents a random selection of 20 African countries and indicates the following: 
(a) most African leaders view the youth’s main objective and role as that of entertainment, chasing 
footballs and dancing/singing during national events. It is for this reason that in most African 
countries youth ministries are placed together with recreation, sports, national service or civic 
education.; but (b) Zimbabwe sees youth in relation to economic empowerment and indigenization, 
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Kenya links youth to planning, and Rwanda links youth to ICT which provides a new and fresh 
perspective that departs from the orthodox linkage of youth to entertainment and sports. With the 
exception of few cases, this illustrates that youth are perceived as peripheral issues. It is therefore 
understandable that youth play a very small, if any, role in continental agenda setting.  
 As such, it can be argued that despite its predecessor the OAU that started off as a people-
centered continental body that at one point assisted non-state actors fighting for national liberation, 
the AU remains engaged in elite politics. It is therefore no surprise that, although Agenda 2063 
speaks about fighting for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, the AU recently 
resolved to admit Morocco to the African Union without a clear explanation and direction 
(Kazeem, 2017). What is clear is that once an elite pact is concluded, the aspiration of young men 
and women fighting with determination in Western Sahara does not matter (Akwei, 2017). The 
youth, including those of Western Sahara, are to remain beneficiaries of the ‘generous’ elders who 
have mentioned them in key documents such as Agenda 2063. When the African passport was 
launched at the 27th Summit of the AU in Kigali, Rwanda, the first recipients where not youth to 
symbolize a future-looking continent but the African elites, Rwandan President Paul Kagame and 
Chadian President Idris Deby Itno, who already enjoy diplomatic privileges until death. Giving 
these individuals African passports thus becomes irrelevant on close inspection (Adibe, 2016). 
These are amongst the many reasons that support the argument that the AU prioritizes elite interest 
dwarfing any elevation of matters such as youth political participation. 
In a 2011 Afrobarometer’s working paper titled The Political Participation of Africa’s 
Youth: Turnout, Partisanship and Protest, Danielle Resnick and Daniela Casale capture the 
orientation of African youth as it relates to political participation:  
 
Our findings suggest that Africa’s youth, particularly those residing in urban areas, operate 
in broadly similar ways to their counterparts in other regions of the world. In comparison 
with their older compatriots, the youth vote less and are more likely to demonstrate no 
partisanship or an attachment to opposition parties rather than any affinity to incumbent 
parties. Yet, the likelihood of their involvement in protests is not significantly different 
from that of their older counterparts.  Moreover, we find that the youth, unlike older voters, 
tend to vote less the longer an incumbent party has been in office. In addition, poor 
incumbent performance on job creation, compared with other socio-economic issues, 
increases the likelihood of the youth to express either no partisanship or an affinity to the 
opposition. In terms of protest activity, higher levels of education and economic 
deprivation, as well as a lack of satisfaction with democracy, increase the likelihood that 
the youth will protest while demonstrating a null impact on their older cohorts’ protest 
activities. (Resnick & Casale, 2011, p. 2) 
At the time Resnick and Casale (2011) published their paper, Africa had just experienced 
the youth-led uprising in North Africa that toppled long-serving dictators and authoritarian leaders. 
As stated in the introduction to this paper, a young Mohamed Bouazizi found himself in 
circumstances that were confirmed by the studies of Resnick and Casale, which led him to setting 
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himself alight and becoming a martyr of the youth-led revolution that spread fast and had as its 
casualty some long-serving African authoritarian leaders. The marginalization of the youth and the 
consequences thereto can be placed squarely at the doorstep of an unresponsive policy 
environment and the ‘periphering’ of the youth from mainstream political participation. Indeed, it 
is the failure of African states to engage the youth into activities that are aimed at influencing the 
selection, constituting and general decisions of the government bureaucracy. As previously stated, 
the marginalization of the youth from mainstream political participation and ‘periphering’ the 
youth did not leave the youth idling. They found alternative forms of political participation at their 
location - the periphery. To the surprise of many, as what happened with the Arab Spring and with 
popular urbanized protests in southern Africa, the periphery found its way to the mainstream 
forcing the political elite to either capitulate or engage those who were seen as ‘peripherised’ 
(Branch & Mampilly, 2015).  
 The AU in Agenda 2063 adopted a language and grammar that can be said to have 
diagnosed the danger of ‘peripherising’ the youth. In what can be seen as either appeasement or 
commitment to prevent the relapse of the popular protests, Agenda 2063 promised that “all forms 
of systemic inequalities, exploitation, marginalization and discrimination of young people will be 
eliminated, and youth issues mainstreamed in all development agendas” (AUC, 2015). Although 
the AU documents, such as Agenda 2063, appear to suggest that the AU and its member states are 
somewhat committed to bring about real political participation, its rhetoric does not seem to be 
supported by credible institutional arrangements. Consider the Youth Division of the AU that is 
responsible for Africa’s youth agenda at the AUC. The division explains that it promotes youth 
participation by “organizing forums and celebrating Africa Youth Day” (AU, 2017). It goes further 
to admit that its mandate is to use the outcomes and recommendations to strengthen the youth. 
This is a clear indication of two things: firstly, like is the case amongst AU member states, the AU 
understands the youth in the context of entertainment and celebration days like Africa Youth Day; 
secondly, it is an admission that the mandate of the division is not to influence decisions but to use 
the outcomes and recommendation (already made) to strengthen the youth. In other words, youth 
are to be beneficiaries and recipients of the “generosity” of the elders. Had the AUC, its youth 
division and member states been interested in genuine political participation, it would have 
endorsed campaigns such as Not Too Young to Run, supported and spearheaded by the UN 
Secretary-General’s Envoy on Youth, Ahmad Alhendawi. This campaign aims at doing away with 
restrictive practices, particularly in most African countries, where state policy prevents young 
people from running for public office (Srour, 2016) 
 
Conclusion – What Is To Be Done? 
 
Make the Circle Bigger  
 If there is any lesson to be learned from recent popular and far-reaching events spearheaded 
by the youth from the Arab Spring in North Africa to violent extremists in West and East Africa 
and popular urbanized protests in southern Africa, it is this: it is in the interest of the African elites 
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to engage the African youth and ensure that they facilitate political participation in mainstream 
national politics in a genuine, inclusive and constructive manner. The African youth have proven 
that they do not need permission and are capable of organizing their own independent forms of 
political participation that often lead to their desired outcomes - destructive as it may seem 
particularly to those profiting in an exclusive status quo. It is in the interest of peaceful coexistence 
for the African leaders to create an enabling environment for political participation of youth. The 
current leaders must, indeed, make the circle bigger.  
 
Linking Youth to Economic Freedom 
The underlying objective of the African liberation struggle against colonialism was not 
only to bring about self-determination but also to solve the then contractions of political power. 
The understanding and imagination of the liberating leaders, such as the likes of Kwame Nkrumah, 
were that political freedom will lead to economic freedom for the oppressed masses on the African 
continent. In fact, one of Nkrumah’s famous phrases has been one that states that you first seek 
the political kingdom and the rest shall be added unto you. The ‘rest’ that Nkrumah was referring 
to is seen as the economic kingdom. It is now a common understanding that Nkrumah’s dream was 
not fulfilled (Mashele & Qobo, 2014). This dismal failure has not left youth idling. The youth have 
understood the liberating generation as having failed economically thus necessitating the current 
need for economic freedom fighters to emerge and fight for economic freedom (Shivambu, 2014). 
Although the youth understands that their mission is to continue the incomplete struggle to solve 
the remaining contradictions of economic power, the struggle was started by the liberating 
generation, and it has become impossible to pursue this struggle without confronting the very same 
fighters and victors of political freedom because of their positionality (Seibeb, 2016). For as long 
as the AU member states continue to define youth from the perspective of entertainment, sports 
and agents of celebration during national festivals and events, conflicts between these states and 
the youth will continue to occur. As such, examples of Zimbabwe, Rwanda and Kenya who locate 
youth in the context of economic freedom – viewing youth as an agency of solving the remaining 
contradictions of economic power – must be emulated.  
 
Appropriate African Community Outlook to Youth State Policy  
Because of the conduct of the politics of the state, the liberation generation has often taken 
an opportunistic approach to the appropriation of African tradition and culture. The African 
political elites often resort to African tradition and practices such as respect of elders to 
opportunistically escape from accountability and evade serious questions related to their political 
conduct. There are several African practices and value systems that remain important and can assist 
in bringing about the youth’s political participation in the mainstream national discourse. One such 
African value system is the African outlook or conceptualization of a community. Africans have 
always understood the community as consisting of (a) the dead, (b) the living, and (c) those yet to 
be born (Kamalu, 2000). The dead are regarded as part of the community although may not be 
visible to everyone. They are in the ancestry watching over, supervising and protecting the living. 
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For their part, the living plays a dual role: firstly, they live their lives and lead society in adherence 
in regard and observation of the values and norms that were left by the departed who are in the 
ancestry and part of the community watching over them; secondly, the living leads their lives and 
society in such a way that they preserve a good community for those who have yet to arrive on 
earth. The community must be preserved in such a way that when the living takes their position in 
the ancestry, they will be watching over the new living (the present unborn) who will preside over 
a community that they left in good shape. The African elites opportunistically leave out this 
outlook that has ensured accountability and self-regulation in the African traditional society 
(Sesanti, 2011). An individual with this outlook would be hesitant of stealing the collective 
resources for personal use because he/she is cognizant of the ancestors who are watching his deeds, 
even those committed behind closed doors. He/She would be bothered by the thought of one-day 
sitting in the ancestry witnessing the living scavenging and suffering because he/she looted and 
squandered collective resources. Said differently and in the context of political participation, the 
African political elite should ensure political participation of the young, fearing an eye-sore when 
they are in the ancestry because they have left the unexposed and inexperienced to take over state 
power without the requisite experiences because they were not given an opportunity to learn and 
practice when they were young.  
 
Decoloniality – Reimagining Africa 
Related to the above discussion is the question of decoloniality, one of the many failures 
of the liberating generation. The common mistake that the African elite have made over the past 
decades of political freedom is to think that it is only them who are concerned about the African 
perspective and the fight against colonialism. They have concluded that the generation of youth 
born after independence has been influenced by western values. The African elites always see the 
demands by this generation of youth as sponsored from outside, and thus concluded that the 
growing dissent is the artwork of the underground of a ‘third force.’  The youth of southern Africa, 
through popular radical protests against inequality, poverty, underdevelopment and neoliberalism, 
have taken the African elites by surprise once it occurred that the discontentment is homegrown 
and, in some instances, has strong Pan Africa, Black Consciousness and African communalistic 
values (Mabhena, 2016). The demands on the state through radical protest actions for decent and 
dignified housing for all and the demands for free quality decolonized higher education are all 
prevalent in southern African as a case in point. The state and African elites must seriously 
consider taking the decolonial discourse serious, and this includes dealing with the questions of 
coloniality of power, coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being. All these questions raised 
by the youth of Africa speak to the deficit of their political participation.  
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